Bias and the Commitment to Disclosure by Heinle, Mirko S & Verrecchia, Robert E
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers Wharton Faculty Research
10-2016
Bias and the Commitment to Disclosure
Mirko S. Heinle
University of Pennsylvania
Robert E. Verrecchia
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Business Administration, Management, and
Operations Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/9
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heinle, M. S., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2016). Bias and the Commitment to Disclosure. Management Science, 62 (10), 2859-2870.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2283
Bias and the Commitment to Disclosure
Abstract
This paper studies the propensity of firms to commit to disclose information that is subsequently biased, in
the presence of other firms also issuing potentially biased information. An important aspect of such an
analysis is the fact that firms can choose whether to disclose or withhold information. We show that allowing
the number of disclosed reports to be endogenous introduces a countervailing force to some of the empirical
predictions from the prior literature. For example, we find that as more firms issue reports or as the correlation
across firms’ cash flows increases, the firm biases its report less. However, when we treat firms’ disclosure
choices as endogenous, we show that the number of firms that commit to disclose decreases as the correlation
across these cash flows increases, and this, in turn, offsets the direct effect of the correlation on bias.
Keywords
committed disclosure, earnings guidance, bias, multiple firms
Disciplines
Accounting | Business Administration, Management, and Operations
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/9
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635092 
Bias and the Commitment to Disclosure
Mirko S. Heinle
Robert E. Verrecchia
University of Pennsylvania
June 2015
Abstract
This paper studies the propensity of rms to commit to disclose information that is subse-
quently biased, in the presence of other rms also issuing potentially biased information. An
important aspect of such an analysis is the fact that rms can choose whether to disclose or
withhold information. We show that allowing the number of disclosed reports to be endoge-
nous introduces a countervailing force to some of the empirical predictions from the prior
literature. For example, we nd that as more rms issue a report or as the correlation across
rmscash ows increases, the rm biases its report less. However, when we treat rms
disclosure choices as endogenous, we show that the number of rms that commit to disclose
decreases as the correlation across these cash ows increases, and this, in turn, o¤sets the
direct e¤ect of the correlation on bias.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of rmscommitment to
disclose information. Specically, we combine following aspects of rmsdisclosure decisions.
First, rms bias the information they disclose to change prices in a favorable way. Second,
the extent to which rms bias their disclosure depends on the information disclosed by other
rms. Third, rms are more likely to commit to disclose information when there is a larger
value to managing prices in the future. That is, we investigate the propensity of a rm to
commit to disclose information in conjunction with subsequently biasing the disclosure, in the
presence of other rms also issuing potentially biased reports. Our main contribution comes
from investigating a setting with multiple rms that choose whether to commit to disclose.
By treating the number of rms that commit to disclose as endogenous, we derive predictions
on how various exogenous variables, such as cash ow uncertainty and the quality of rms
private information, a¤ect the number of reports provided by the rms in an industry.
In our model, we extend Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) in that we allow multiple rms to
commit to disclosing information ex ante but have discretion ex post about the exact infor-
mation that is disclosed.1 That is, a rm voluntarily commits to disclose information prior to
receiving it and independent of its content, but can bias the disclosed information. While our
setting seems to be descriptive of rms commitment to voluntary disclosure, it extends to
certain kinds of mandatory disclosures. For example, rms choose their exposure to manda-
tory disclosure regimes when they choose whether and where to list, or whether to adopt
IFRS. Prior analytical literature commonly assumes a commitment to disclose; furthermore,
1 This is in contrast to ex post disclosure, which is disclosed conditional on its information content.
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empirical evidence suggests that this is consistent with various voluntary disclosure choices.2
We summarize the predictions from our model as follows. With an exogenous number of
rms that disclose, the extent of bias in disclosure is lower when more reports are disclosed
and/or when rmscash ows are more highly correlated. The reason for these results is
straightforward: the more information that is available to investors, the less they rely on a
rms own report to estimate the rms future prospects. As the weight that investors assign
to a rms report in its own price decreases, the benet of introducing bias decreases, and
hence expected bias decreases.
With an endogenous number of rms that disclose, we nd that fewer rms commit to
disclose when the prior uncertainty about rmscash ows decreases, or rmscash ows
have a higher correlation. In our model, prior uncertainty about cash ows captures the
markets demand about information and the quality of rmsprivate information. A lower
demand for information naturally leads to fewer rms issuing reports. The result concerning
the correlation across rmscash ows can be explained as follows. An increase in correlation,
ceteris paribus, increases the amount of information investors have about a rms cash ow,
and thus reduces the extent to which rms are able to inuence prices by issuing a biased
report. Hence, while the costs of issuing a report remain constant, the benets decrease and
fewer rms commit to disclose. This also leads us to predict that in a given industry, the
rms whose reports are least informative about the industry are the most likely rms to
issue one. Finally, allowing the number of rms that disclose to be endogenous introduces a
countervailing force to some of the results from the prior literature: for example, the extent
2 For analytical literature, see, e.g., Goex and Wagenhofer (2009), Cheynel and Levine (2012), Gao and
Liang (2013), and Michaeli (2014). For empirical literature, see, e.g., Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2011)
and Tang (2012). Li, Wasley, and Zimmerman (2012) estimates that 63% of management forecasts in their
sample are released to lower the rms cost of capitaland thus purposefully ex ante.
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of bias in disclosed information is constant over changes in the uncertainty about rmscash
ows.
For the main part, the theory-based literature on reporting bias has limited itself to
studying bias when only a single rm issues a report.3 Most related is Fischer and Verrecchia
(2000) where a rm discloses a report but investors are uncertain about the rms incentive
to manage earnings. The rm is therefore able to fool the market as investors cannot
perfectly anticipate the rms bias.4 This gives rise to a value of disclosure to rms ex
ante because the rm anticipates that it can successfully react to its future preferences by
managing share prices.
While the rm in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) always discloses, Korn (2004), Kwon,
Newman, and Zang (2009), and Einhorn and Ziv (2012) study settings where a single rm
decides whether to disclose potentially biased information. In these settings, the rm with-
holds su¢ ciently bad news and, conditional on disclosure, the market can perfectly back out
any bias because it is informed about the rms incentives. Korn (2004) nds that as the
cost of biasing becomes very low (very high) a no-disclosure equilibrium arises (a truthful,
full-disclosure equilibrium arises). Because rm values are drawn from a nite interval, a
partly separating equilibrium exists for some costs of misreporting where rms with low
rm values do not disclose, rms with intermediate values disclose biased reports, and rms
with high values disclose the upper threshold. Einhorn and Ziv (2012) allows for non-linear
equilibria and shows that the amount of bias increases in the privately observed information.
Similarly, Beyer and Guttman (2012) assumes that a rm privately observes the pro-
3 Stocken (2012) and Bertomeu (2013), respectively, provide a review and an overview of the literature.
4 Other reasons to prevent perfect unraveling of bias include strategic pooling (e.g., Guttman, Kadan,
and Kandel, 2006), probabilistic earnings management (e.g., Gao, 2013 or Laux and Stocken, 2012), and
incentives to manage earnings over time (e.g., Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002).
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ductivity of an investment opportunity, then chooses the rms investment level, and nally
decides whether to (truthfully) publish the level of investment. The rm overinvests (real
manipulation) in the attempt to make investors believe that the investment productivity is
higher. The analysis shows that while rms with low and high productivity invest in prof-
itable new investments, rms with intermediate forego the investment opportunity due to
the interaction between disclosure and investment.
There are few exceptions to the single-rm assumption. These papers either assume that
disclosure of information is truthful or that it is mandatory. Dye and Sridhar (1995) considers
truthful ex post disclosure by multiple rms where the information endowment by rms is
unknown to the public and the receipt of information is positively correlated across rms. In
this setting, disclosure herding arises; when one rm discloses information, the probability
that other rms disclose increases. Similar to our results, Dye and Sridhar predict that a
rm is less likely to disclose when more other rms with correlated cash ows disclose. Our
model, as well as Dye and Sridhar (1995), assumes that rms simultaneously decide whether
to disclose a report. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012) studies truthful ex post disclosure
where two rms sequentially choose whether to disclose. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter nd
that the rmspropensity to issue reports depends on the extent and sign of their correlation.
Bagnoli and Watts (2010) and Fischer and Verrecchia (2004) analyze bias in settings with
multiple rms who engage in product market competition. Strobl (2013) investigates cost
of capital implications from rmsbiasing behavior in a setting where a given number of
rms have to disclose earnings. Finally, while Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) does not
investigate multiple rms, it allows for multiple actors by investigating a setting where a
biased report is analyzed, modied, and potentially biased by an audit committee.
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2 The Model
We consider a one-period disclosure-bias game withN risk-neutral, homogeneous rms out of
which M rms commit to disclose potentially biased information in a perfectly competitive
market with risk-neutral investors. Each of these rms yields a terminal value of ~vi, i =
1; :::; N , where the common priors for ~vi are that each ~vi has a normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance 2. In addition, we assume that the covariance between any ~vi and any
~vj, i 6= j, is 2. During the period, rms privately observe a noisy measure of earnings,
~ei = ~vi + ~ni, where it is common knowledge that the ~ni are independent and identically
distributed, each from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance . After observing
earnings, M rms disclose information. Unlike rm i, the market and the other rms do not
observe the realization of ~ei. Consequently, the market price of rm i is a function of the
markets prior beliefs, as well as rmsreports. As rmscash ows are correlated, investors
use all available reports to determine the price of rm i. Consistent with the discussion in
the introduction, we assume that rms commit either to disclose or withhold the information
before they observe the realization of ~ei. This implies that whether a rm issues a report
does not, by itself, change investorsexpectations about any rms future cash ow.
Let Pi represent the market price of rm i and let y = fy1; y2; :::; yMg be the set of rms
reports. Because we assume that the market is perfectly competitive and risk-neutral, the
price of rm i is the rational expectation of its terminal value, ~vi, conditioned upon the set
of reports, y:
Pi = E [~vijy] . (1)
We assume that rm i has some discretion over the accounting for the report and can use
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that discretion to disclose the observed earnings, ~ei, or to report some other number. We
interpret the di¤erence between the observed earnings and the number actually disclosed
as bias in the report. Formally, conditional on rm i observing earnings of ~ei = ei, the
disclosed report, yi , equals ei + bi where bi is the bias rm i introduces.
Following Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), we assume that in choosing a level of bias, rm
i attempts to maximize its objective function, which we characterize by the expression:
Ui = xiPi   c
2
b2i  K, (2)
where ~xi = xi is the realization of a random event that rm i alone observes, Pi is the market
price for the rm, c is some known positive parameter, c
2
b2i represents the known cost of bias
to rm i, and K is a xed cost the rm bears when disclosing information. Similar to the
broad disclosure literature, we interpret K as proprietary costs or verication costs.5 As
noted above, the utility function in eqn. (2) reects a rms desire to manage its price. We
refer to the rm here as a representation of the board and/or managers who make the actual
disclosure decisions. That ~xi is a random variable reects the idea that price preferences can
vary over time.
We assume that it is common knowledge that the variables ~xi are identically distributed
with a normal distribution with mean  and variance , and that they are independent of
~ni and ~vi. Given its inability to discern the rms precise preferences, the market can only
conjecture the extent to which the rm has incentives to inate or deate expectations.
Note that as we assume ~xi has a normal distribution, its realization can be either positive
5 See, for example, Admati and Peiderer (2000), Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012), or Verrecchia
(1983).
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or negative, where the latter captures situations in which rms prefer to deate prices.
We summarize the element of time in our model as follows. At t = 0 each rm commits
to either issuing a report or not. At t = 1 each rm receives a private earnings signal, M
rms that (at t = 0) committed to disclose a (potentially biased) report do so and prices
are set. Finally, at t = 2 uncertainty unravels. We solve the model by backward induction,
starting with the equilibrium to the disclosure-bias game when M rms commit to disclose.
3 A Linear Equilibrium
3.1 The Equilibrium at t = 1
In this section we construct an equilibrium to our disclosure-bias game. We restrict our
analysis to linear equilibria (i.e., prices that are linear in y and bias strategies that are
linear in ei and xi) because they are easily characterized and yield compelling intuition.
An equilibrium at t = 1 consists of a bias function for each of the rms, bi (ei; xi), and M
pricing functions for the market, Pi, such that three conditions are satised. First, rm is
choice of bias for each realization fei; xig, bi (ei; xi), solves its optimization problem given
its conjecture as to the market response. Second, rm is market price equals the expected
rm value, ~vi, based on all reports y, and a conjecture about the bias strategy of each rm
type. Third, expectations are met in equilibrium. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
a rms commitment to either disclose or withhold a report is observable both by the market
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and the other rms. Thus, we conjecture an equilibrium of the form:
bi (ei; xi) = iy + ieei + ixxi, and (3)
Pi (y) =  +
MX
j=1
ijyj. (4)
We use rm is optimization problem and the market-pricing function for rm i to prove
that there exists a unique linear equilibrium.
A Firms Problem at t = 1: We briey derive the biasing strategies and the market
pricing functions as they mainly follow Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). To begin, suppose
that rm i conjectures that the price of his rm based on all reports, y, is of the form given
by eqn. (4) with conjectured values of ^ and ^ij8i; j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg. The linear conjecture
about the pricing function, coupled with the objective function in eqn. (2), implies that rm
is objective is strictly concave in bi. Thus, the rms optimal bias is given by the rst-order
condition, which yields:
bi (ei; xi) =
^ii
c
xi (5)
for all fei; xig. This implies that iy = ie = 0 and ix = ^ii=c. Di¤erent from Fischer
and Verrecchia (2000), we allow multiple rms to disclose and bias. However, as we assume
that prices are a linear function of all disclosed reports, the di¤erence between two reports
is irrelevant for investors and rms. That is, rm i ignores the reports of all other rms and
the level of its own price when introducing bias. This indicates that if ^ii = ^jj, rms i and
j react in the same way to their individual observations of ~xi and ~xj. Note that because
a rm privately observes its earnings signal, it has an information advantage over investors
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about all rmsterminal values. However, as the bias chosen by rm i is independent of the
earnings signal, no rm has an information advantage about the bias chosen by any other
rm.
Market Pricing Function: Now we turn to the market pricing function. Assume a con-
jectured bias function of the form specied by eqns. (3) and (5).6 The market price of rm
i is equal to the expectation of rm is terminal value conditional on all reports:
Pi = i + 1yi + 2
MX
j=1;j 6=i
yj, where (6)
 =   (1 + (M   1) 2) ^ix, (7)
1 =
2
Q1
 
2 (1  ) (1 + (M   1) ) +  + 2ix

, (8)
2 =
2
Q1
 
 + 2ix

, and (9)
Q1 =
 
2 (1 + (M   1) ) +  + 2ix
  
2 (1  ) +  + 2ix

. (10)
Intuitively, eqn. (6) provides the expression for rm value that results from regressing the
terminal value of rm i, ~vi, on the set of reports, y. Note that the pricing function is indeed
linear in rmsreports. Also note that the weight a rms report receives in its price is the
same for all rms (i.e., ii = 1 for all i); furthermore, all report other than rm is receive
equal weight in Pi (i.e., ij = 2 for all i 6= j). This follows from our assumption that ex ante
all rms are homogeneous (i.e., 2i = 
2
j = 
2 and Cov [~vi; ~vj] = Cov [~vi; ~vk] = 2) such that
the information about rm i provided by yj is as valuable to investors as the information
provided by yk, where j; k 6= i. As ii = 1 for all i, each rms response to a realization of
6 Note that eqn. (5) implies that iy = 0, ie = 0, and ix =
^ii
c .in eqn. (3). Because the rst two results
hold regardless of the conjecture about the linear-pricing function, we restrict both to 0 for the remainder
of the analysis.
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~xi is the same for all rms (i.e., ix = x for all i).
Similar to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), the conjectured coe¢ cient on the realization of
~xi in the rmsbias function, ^x, captures the conjectured extent of bias. Because biasing
activities add noise to the reports, from the markets perspective, the market sensitivity to
rm is report in its price, 1, decreases when the market believes that the rm is biasing to
a greater extent. Our assumption that all rms are homogeneous, however, implies that as
j^xj becomes larger, more of the variance of all reports is attributable to ~xi. At the extremes,
when the market believes reports manifest no bias, ^x ! 0, the weight in price is maximized.
When the market believes that bias is unbounded, j^xj ! 1, the rmsreports do not a¤ect
prices.
To derive the equilibrium, we replace the conjectures in eqns. (5) and (6) with their
equilibrium values and then show that the four equations have a unique solution. Note
that eqns. (5), (7), and (9) imply that  and 2 are unique functions of x and/or 1.
Furthermore, from eqn. (5), it is easy to see that x can be written as a unique function of
1. This implies that for there to be a unique solution, there must exist a unique value for
1 that solves eqns. (5) and (8). Solving eqns. (3) and (5) for x and substituting it in for
x in eqn. (8) provides the following equilibrium condition
0 = F (1) = 1  
c22
Q2
 
c22 (1  ) (1 + (M   1) ) + c2 + 21

, (11)
with Q2 =
 
c22 (1 + (M   1) ) + c2 + 21
  
c22 (1  ) + c2 + 21

. Note that the un-
certainty about rms preferences is crucial for biasing activities to a¤ect the weight of
reports in price. If this was not the case, i.e.  = 0, the market sensitivity is identical to
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that attained when rms are constrained to disclose the observed earnings signal (while rms
would still introduce bias as long as  6= 0, this will be perfectly anticipated by the market
and thus taken out).
Finally, note that F (1) has a unique positive solution for 1 when the number of rms
that disclose is exogenous. This case essentially reects Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) with
multiple rms. Accordingly, the characteristics of the equilibrium and the comparative
statics from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) still apply. Specically, 1 is decreasing in the
uncertainty about rmspreferences, constant in the expected value of preferences, increasing
in the quality of the earnings observed by rms and the prior uncertainty regarding terminal
value, and increasing in the marginal cost of bias.
In addition to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), 1 is decreasing in the correlation across
cash ows and in the number of rms that disclose.7 An increase in the correlation among
rmscash ows increases the amount of information an investor can glean about the terminal
cash ow of a rm from any other rms report. This implies that the weight the market
assigns to rm js report when evaluating rm i increases, and hence the weight on rm
is own report decreases. In the limit (i.e.,  ! 1), the weight on both rmsreports is
identical: that is, 1 ! 2, which can be seen by setting  = 1 in eqns. (8) and (9). This
result arises from our assumption that all rms are homogeneous, and hence the quality of,
and the bias in, reports is the same. Similarly, the more rms, M , that issue a report, the
more information that is available for the market to assess the value of a rm. This leads to
a lower market sensitivity.
7 Table 2 summarizes all relevant comparative static results for both an exogenous and an endogenous
number of rms that disclose.
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While this discussion indicates that extending Fischer and Verrecchia to multiple rms
does not change the results, it also indicates that the number of disclosing rms has an e¤ect
on the equilibrium. The main contribution of our model is to discuss the incentives that
rms have to disclose information. Specically, we assume that rms anticipate their interest
in managing their stock price. Because variations in 1 a¤ect the extent to which rms can
manage prices, these variations also a¤ect the incentives to disclose information in the rst
place. The following subsection investigates rmsdecision to disclose information.
3.2 The Equilibrium at t = 0
In order to investigate the number of rms that disclose reports and its e¤ect on the results
derived above, we rst characterize a rms expected utility when disclosing a (potentially
biased) report. Here we assume that (i) a rm faces additional proprietary cost of K from
disclosure; (ii) that the commitment to disclose is made before observing the realizations of
~ei and ~xi; and (iii) that rms commit to disclose if they expect to prot from the option to
manage their price. The equilibrium concept we apply is similar to the one in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980): if the expected utility of a rm that commits to disclose is higher than the
expected utility of a rm that commits not to disclose, one of the latter will also commit to
disclose.8 With these assumptions, using the equilibrium condition that bi = xi (1=c), the
ex ante utility of rm i when committing to issue a report is:
E
h
~xiPi   c
2
~b2i  K
i
=
21
2c
 
   2 K. (12)
8 Similar to the investors in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), all rms in our model are homogeneous ex
ante; thus, which specic rms commit to disclose is irrelevant.
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In contrast, if rm i does not disclose a report, then its ex ante expected utility is given by:
E
"
~xi
 
 + 2
MX
j=1

~bj + ~ej
!#
= 0. (13)
Eqn. (12) provides some further insight to our formulation of the benets and costs of
disclosing information. Committing to disclose allows a rm to bias this disclosure so that
it can manage the price in response to its preferences. The ability to manage prices comes
at a cost that is twofold: 1) the xed cost K, and 2) the direct cost of introducing bias 1
2
cb2i .
As investors correct for any expected bias,  negatively enters the expected utility, similar
to the deadweight cost in the signal-jamming literature (e.g., Stein, 1989).9 However, the
commitment to disclose allows the rm to manage price in response to its preferences ~x.
Managing prices, in turn, becomes more valuable as the rm faces higher uncertainty about
its future preferences.10
It follows from eqns. (12) and (13) that the rm prefers disclosure whenever 21
 2
2c
 K >
0, which implies that following condition has to hold:
 > 2. (14)
As Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) notes, eqn. (14) can be thought of as capturing the
uncertainty about whether rms will try to inate or deate prices relative to the expected
9 If investors did not expect rms to introduce bias (i.e., if  = 0), then both  and  would increase the
benet of disclosure to the rm.
10 See Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the ex ante benets of biasing.
To strengthen the link between our model and the notion that rms attempt to manage expectations
one could assume that the rms benet whenever their preferences deviate from expectations, i.e., when
UM = (~xi   )Pi   c2b2i . In this case the above condition would reduce to 21 2c  K = 0.
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bias. Specically, when  is large or when 2 is close to 0, the probability that rms inate
their reports (and the respective prices) and the probability that rms deate their reports
move closer together (i.e., each probability approaches one-half). With this interpretation,
eqn. (14) suggests that when ex ante uncertainty about types is large ( is large or  is close
to 0), rms benet from the option to bias. On the other hand, when rms almost always
desire higher or lower prices (i.e.,  is small or  is far from 0), investors can back out almost
all bias from the reports, which makes the ex ante returns to biasing behavior negative.
As the option to move price in the preferred direction is the only benet of disclosure
in our model, the uncertainty about rmsincentives has to be su¢ ciently high (i.e., eqn.
(14) has to hold) for a rm to provide a report: if  < 2, a rm incurs negative expected
utility from disclosing a report such that no rm would commit to disclosure. For the
remainder of the analysis we assume  > 2. Alternatively, in Dye and Sridhar (2008) the
market knows the rmsprice preferences but is uncertain about the cost of manipulation.
When withholding disclosure eliminates the cost of manipulation, all rms would prefer
to not disclose (because a rms ex ante expected price is independent of the disclosure).
That is, a rm prefers to withhold information when this eliminates the preference (cost)
uncertainty.11 We argue that it is realistic to assume that rms have an interest in managing
their prices (see, for example, Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; and Rogers and Stocken, 2005).
While we provide empirical guidance under the assumption that  > 2, whether the benet
of disclosure in managing stock price outweighs the cost of manipulation is an empirical
question.
11 For example, assume that the uncertainty in the cost of manipulation represents uncertainty about
when it is costly to not walk expectations up or down. In this case, non-disclosure could be interpreted as
not managing expectations and the rm faces a cost in the non-disclosure case.
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We assume that there are N rms in the economy out of which M rms commit to
disclose. In order to avoid a trivial solution we assume that N > M . In equilibrium
expected utility from disclosure has to equal the expected utility from not disclosing, which,
following eqn. (13), equals zero:
^
2
1
   2
2c
 K = 0. (15)
Since at the time a manager decides whether to issue a report he does not know how many
rms will decide to do so, ^1 in eqn. (15) is a function of the expectation about the number
of rms that decide to disclose, M^ . Expectations have to be met in equilibrium, such that
M^ = M has to hold.
In the last subsection we developed the intuition for why the equilibrium in market pricing
and managerial biasing at t = 1 can be written as an equilibrium in 1. Combined with the
requirement that ^1 = 1 and eqn. (15), the resulting equilibrium is a pair f1;Mg that
solves eqns. (11) and (15). From eqn. (11) it is obvious that 1 is a function of the exogenous
parameters as well as M ; this is the case because the extent to which investors use a rms
report depends on the quality of information they can glean from it, and also depends on
the amount of information they can glean from all other reports. The more information is
available, the less weight investors place on any single report. This logically implies that 1
decreases in M . Eqn. (15) then shows that the number of rms that commit to disclose will
adjust such that 1 =
q
K 2c
 2 .
From eqn. (15), it is straightforward that an exogenous increase in 1 will increase
the benet of disclosure, which, in turn, should increase M . On the other hand, when the
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number of issued reports increases, investors can use more information and, thus, potentially
decrease the weight on any specic rms report. These two e¤ects introduce a tension into
the model and can yield a solution where some but not all rms commit to disclose.
Finally, from eqn. (15), it is easy to see that 1 can be written as a unique function of
the exogenous parameters. We complete the proof by taking the solution for 1 from eqn.
(15), substituting it in eqn. (11), and then showing that the resulting equation has a unique
solution for M : the resulting equilibrium condition for M is given by G (M) = 0, where
G (M) =
p
cX   c2 c +X + c
2 (1  ) (1 + (M   1) )
(c +X + c2 (1 + (M   1) )) (c +X + c2 (1  )) (16)
and X = 2K
 2 . It is straightforward to see that eqn. (16) is strictly increasing in M . This
indicates that if G (M = 0) < 0 and G (M = N) > 0, there exists a unique solution for M
such that G (M) = 0. The lower and upper bound on the exogenous parameters indicate
that if, for example, the xed cost of disclosure, K, is too high (low), no rm (all rms) will
commit to disclose and, thus, no interior solution exists. Proposition 1 shows the existence
of a linear equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium for the disclosure-bias game: P (y) =
 + 1yi + 2
MP
j=1;j 6=i
yj and bi (ei; xi) = y + eei + xxi, where M and 1 solve G (M) = 0,
21
 2
2c
= K,  =   (1 + (M   1) 2)x, 2 = 
2
Q1
 
 + 2x

, y = 0, e = 0, x =
1
c
, and Q1 =
 
2 (1 + (M   1) ) +  + 2x
  
2 (1  ) +  + 2x

if G (M = 0) < 0 and
G (M = N) > 0.
Note that, similar to Admati and Peiderer (2000) and Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012),
when the rms cash ows are not correlated, the game reduces to a single-rm game
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because eqn. (16) is independent of M when we substitute  = 0. The lower bound
on the exogenous parameters indicates that when the cost of disclosure, K, is too high
(
q
2cK
 2 > c
2 X+c+c
2(1 )2
(X+c+c2(1 ))2 ), no rm commits to disclose. The upper bound suggests
that when there are too few rms in the industry (N is too small) or when the cost of dis-
closure is too small (
q
2cK
 2 <
c2(1 )
c2(1 )+c+X , when N and M approach innity), all rms
commit to disclose. In the latter situation, the analysis from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000)
applies, as discussed above.
Finally, in the knife edge case of perfect correlation,  = 1, all reports are equally valuable
to the investors of a specic rm such that 1 = 2 = . In this situation, the condition F ()
from eqn. (11) reduces to  = 
2
M2++(=c)2
. This condition is similar to the one in Fischer
and Verrecchia (2000), adjusted for the number of reports. That is, the more reports are
available, the lower the weight on any specic report (via the termM2 in the denominator).
This reduces the incentives to bias, which makes reports less noisy (via the term (=c)2 ).
The entry condition from eqn. (15) remains unchanged such that the equilibrium condition
from eqn. (16) reduces to
p
cX = c
2
c2M+c+X
. We discuss comparative statics of the general
case in the following section.
4 Empirical Implications
Treating the number of rms that disclose as endogenous provides a countervailing force
to the results documented in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). Intuitively, the countervailing
force arises because changes in exogenous parameters that make it easier to bias the report
also make it more appealing to disclose a report. While the direct e¤ect (more biasing) leads
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to less informative reports, the increase in the number of disclosed reports provides more
information to investors. In this section we provide empirical implications by characterizing
the solution to our model.
4.1 The Number of Firms in Equilibrium
Before providing predictions on the coe¢ cients in a linear regression of reports on price, we
investigate the number of rms that choose to disclose in equilibrium. Corollary 1 summarizes
comparative static results for M in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 When rms can choose whether to disclose, the number of rms that choose
to do so: (i), decreases in the expected value of rmspreferences and the proprietary cost
of disclosure; (ii) increases in the uncertainty about rmspreferences; (iii) increases in the
quality of the earnings observed by the rms and the prior uncertainty regarding terminal
value; (iv) decreases in the correlation across cash ows; and (v) is ambiguous with respect
to the marginal cost of bias.
Note that the results in Corollary 1 are driven by changes in the expected utility from
disclosing a report. From eqn. (15) it is straightforward to see that the number of rms,
M , itself enters the expected benet of disclosure only through its e¤ect on the market
response to disclosure, 1. This implies that while more rms choose to issue a report when
the expected benet increases (i.e.,  increases or  decreases) or the cost, K, decreases,
there is also an indirect e¤ect of changes in exogenous parameters. This indirect e¤ect exists
because changes in parameters also lead to changes in 1. For example, from eqn. (11) we
can infer that an increase in  increases the noise in the disclosed reports, which decreases
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the weight investors place on the report. As Corollary 1 shows, the direct e¤ect of increasing
the expected utility dominates the indirect e¤ect of a decrease in 1.
The 4th, 5th, and 6th comparative static results (i.e., dM=d, dM=d2, and dM=d),
however, are driven by the indirect e¤ect on 1. As discussed above, with an exogenous
determination of M , 1 decreases in  and  (increases in 
2). This reduces (increases) the
expected benet of disclosure and decreases (increases) M . The nal result shows that the
e¤ect of an increase in the marginal cost of bias, c, can increase or decrease the number of
rms that disclose a report in equilibrium. Again, there is a direct e¤ect (a higher c decreases
the expected utility from disclosure) and an indirect e¤ect (ceteris paribus, c increases 1
as reports become less biased, thereby increasing the expected utility). Which of these
dominates depends on the value of the models fundamental parameters.
While the e¤ect of c on M is ambiguous, we know that for su¢ ciently small values of
c the number of rms that disclose increases as c increases, whereas for su¢ ciently large
values of c the number of rms that disclose decreases as c increases. The intuition for this
is as follows, for c = 0 investors treat all reports as pure noise such that no rm has an
incentive to disclose a report. When c increases investors start to include the reports in their
valuation, this provides incentives for rms to disclose. As c increases further, it becomes
increasingly costly for rms to manage their stock price, which reduces their incentives to
disclose information.
Note that the comparative static results in Corollary 1 are a direct result of changes in a
rms expected utility from disclosing a report. This implies that the corollary also speaks
to which rms in an industry are more likely to disclose. However, rm heterogeneity can
reduce the impact of the endogenous disclosure decision. For example, assume some rms
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have very low proprietary costs and the others have very high costs. In this situation, small
changes in exogenous parameters have no e¤ect on the equilibrium when all low cost but no
high cost rms disclose. That is, the endogenous entry condition, eqn. (15), would not bind
and local comparative statics are, similar to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), determined by
eqn. (11).
The empirical literature on the propensity of rms to issue management forecasts in the
presence of proprietary costs is based on Verrecchia (1983) and nds mixed results (e.g., Ali,
Klasa, and Yeung, 2014; and Li, 2010). However, consistent with our setting of a commitment
to disclose, Ali et al also document that rms prefer private over public placements to raise
funds when proprietary costs are higher.
In the ex post disclosure literature, Einhorn (2007) predicts that a rm can withhold
information (is less likely to disclose) when investors are uncertain about whether the rm
prefers to increase or decrease stock price. Corollary 1 suggests the opposite: more rms
disclose when the uncertainty about rmspreferences is higher. The crucial di¤erence is that
we study a commitment to disclose whereas Einhorn investigates discretionary disclosure.
Similarly, in a model of multi period ex post disclosure, Beyer and Dye (2012) suggest that as
future cash ows become more volatile, more rms will disclose contemporaneous information
to develop a reputation for being forthcoming.The reputation provides managers with a
the ability to withhold more negative information (that is, managers can better manage
future stock prices). In Beyer and Dye (2012) fewer managers disclose early as the average
probability of being forthcoming decreases. While this is a result of di¤erent economic forces,
it is similar to our result regarding the expected value of rmspreferences.
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In line with our results, Verrecchia (1990) predicts that an increase in cash ow uncer-
tainty leads to less disclosure. Empirically, Kim, Pandit, and Wasley (2014) suggests higher
cash ow uncertainty leads to a lower frequency of discretionary management earnings fore-
casts. Kim, et al. partly ascribe this nding to the negative impact of greater market
uncertainty on the quality of rmsprivate information. In our model (and in Verrecchia,
1990), the quality of privately observed information captures this aspect of the disclosure
decision. Higher cash ow uncertainty itself increases investorsinterest in obtaining informa-
tion, which increases the value of disclosure. This highlights the importance of controlling for
the quality of rmsinformation when investigating the relation between market uncertainty
and the propensity to disclose.
Finally, Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer (2013) suggests that management forecasts con-
tain macroeconomic information. However, Bonsall at al. do not investigate whether rms
are more likely to issue forecasts when other rms forecasts are more informative about
systematic events.
4.2 Regression of Price on Reports
4.2.1 The Weight on a Firms Own Report
In our model, all reports provide information about one rms cash ows because all rms
reports are correlated. In such a setting, it is a standard result that the incremental infor-
mation conveyed by one report decreases as more reports are available, such that an inverse
relation between M and 1 exists. From eqn. (15), however, it is straightforward that a
rms utility increases in 1, which suggests a complementary relation. This indicates that
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the comparative static results on 1 from the prior literature might be altered when rms
are allowed to choose whether to disclose or not. In what follows, we focus our discussion
on comparative statics that change as a result of allowing rms to choose whether they dis-
close. Corollary 2 summarizes comparative static results on the slope of a rms report in a
regression of its price on all available reports.
Corollary 2 When rms can choose whether to disclose, the weight of a rms report in its
price: (i) increases in the expected value of rmspreferences and the xed cost of disclosure;
and (ii) is constant in the quality of the earnings observed by the rms, the prior uncertainty
regarding terminal value, and the correlation across cash ows.
Note the di¤erence in comparative static results in Corollary 2 to the results in Fischer and
Verrecchia (2000). Specically, while changes in exogenous parameters still have a direct
e¤ect on the weight on a rms report at t = 1, they also have an indirect e¤ect through
the number of rms that commit to disclose at t = 0. That is, while eqn. (11) describes the
direct e¤ect of parameters on 1, eqn. (15), 
2
1
 2
2c
 K = 0, shows that M will adjust such
that changes in , 2, and  will not a¤ect 1.
Furthermore, while increases in K and  have no direct e¤ect on 1, they reduce M
(see Corollary 1), which increases 1. That is, 1 increases in K and  and has an inverse
relation to M . Finally, note that an increase in  (or a decrease in c) decreases 1 when M
is constant. Because M increases in  (decreases in c) the comparative statics from Fischer
and Verrecchia (2000) with respect to  and c are amplied.
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4.2.2 The Weight on Other FirmsReports
Di¤erent from models that focus on a single rm, we study a multi-rm game. Because rms
publish reports that are informative about all rmscash ows, the market uses all reports
when pricing rm i. The existence of other information suggests that if a rm is expected
to introduce more bias (and hence the quality of the report decreases), investors rely less on
his report and increase the weight on other information. Because we assume that all rms
are homogeneous, however, an increase in the expected bias in rm is report comes with a
comparable increase in the expected bias in all other rmsreports; this reduces the weight
these reports receive in the price of rm i. When examining the weight of other information
in price, this indicates that there are two countervailing forces; these countervailing forces
make comparative static results on the slope of another rms report in a regression generally
ambiguous. To illustrate these forces, imagine a simpler setting where rms are unable to
introduce bias into their reports. The only source of noise in the disclosed reports is the
noise in rmsprivate information. When rms receive (and disclose) perfect information,
 = 0, investors only use a rms own report when determining price, i.e., 2 = 0. Increasing
the noise to  > 0 provides a role for other rmsreports such that 2 increases. However,
with an innite level of noise investors will ignore all reports such that, again, 2 = 0.
In order to provide testable results, we investigate the ratio between the weight on another
rms report relative to the weight rm is own report, i.e.,
RW  2
1
=
 (c +X)
c2 (1  ) (1 + (M   1) ) + c +X , (17)
where X = 2K
 2 . Corollary 3 summarizes our results regarding the relative weights of other
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rmsreports and a rms own report in price when we treat M as: (a) endogenous and (b)
exogenous.
Corollary 3 When rms can choose whether to disclose, the ratio of the weight on all other
rms reports and the weight on a rms report in that rms price: (i) increases in the
expected value of managersincentives and the xed cost of disclosure; (ii) decreases in the
uncertainty about managersincentives; and (iii) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal
cost of bias.
Corollary 2 shows that su¢ ciently large changes in , 2, and  have no impact on 1
because they a¤ect the number of rms such that the information that can be gleaned from
a specic rms report remains constant. However, this is not the case for the information
content of other reports such that changes in these parameters a¤ect the relative weights
similar to a setting with a given number of reports. Corollary 3 shows that the endogenous
number of reports does, however, a¤ect the comparative statics with respect to , K, , and
c. Because all reports, other than the rms own report, are perfect substitutes, an increase
in M decreases the relative weights, i.e., @ (2=1) =@M < 0. This implies that the relative
weights increase in  and K and decrease in . AsM can increase or decrease in c, the same
holds true for the relative weights.
4.3 Expected Bias
The bias a rm introduces into the report it provides to the market is determined by the
weight the market assigns to its report when determining his rms market value, the cost of
introducing bias, and the rms price-based incentives, i.e., bi = (1=c)xi. Thus, the extent
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of bias in a given report crucially depends on the rms (unobservable) preferences. As in
prior literature, however, we can make predictions on the expected bias in published reports,
where
E [bi] = (1=c)E [xi] = (1=c). (18)
Clearly, with the potential exception of the result concerning the marginal cost of introducing
bias, the comparative static results from Corollary 2 will continue to hold. The sign of the
results, however, depends on the sign of the rmsexpected preferences, . For the remainder
of our analysis, we assume that rms, on average, have a greater interest to inate price (i.e.,
 > 0), such that expected bias is increasing in the market sensitivity. While the comparative
static with respect to c changes relative to Corollary 2, it remains unchanged from the result
in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). That is, expected bias decreases in c. Similarly, expected
bias increases in the rmsexpected price preferences. Here, the endogenous number of rms
that disclose amplies the result in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) because as  increases,
fewer rms disclose information, which implies that d1=d > 0.
Corollary 4 summarizes comparative static results on expected bias.
Corollary 4 Assume that the rms are more likely to inate price (i.e.,  > 0). When rms
can choose whether to disclose, expected bias: (i) increases in the xed cost of disclosure;
and (ii) is constant in the quality of the earnings observed by the rms, the prior uncertainty
regarding terminal value, and the correlation across cash ows.
Note that in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), expected bias increases in the quality of privately
observed earnings and the prior uncertainty. The reason is that both increase the information
content of disclosure and, thus, the incentives to bias. The endogenous entry o¤sets this such
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that expected bias is independent of the two parameter values.
The empirical evidence in Rogers and Stocken (2005) suggests that uncertainty about
the rmspreference increases expected bias. This is consistent with both our model and
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). However, we are not aware of empirical studies that examine
how the variables in Corollary 4 a¤ect the average bias in disclosure.
4.4 Price e¢ ciency
The nal results we derive consider the information content of issued reports or the degree
of price e¢ ciency (i.e., the extent to which prices reect all relevant public and private
information). One measure of price e¢ ciency is the variance of terminal value conditional
upon the market price, V ar [~vijPi], divided by the prior variance, 2. This measure reects
the proportion of uncertainty remaining after the disclosure. To perform the comparative
static analysis for price e¢ ciency, it is useful to focus on the proportion of variance revealed
by the reports:
V  1  V ar [~vijPi]
2
. (19)
Corollary 5 summarizes comparative static results on price e¢ ciency.
Corollary 5 When rms can choose whether to disclose, price e¢ ciency: (i) decreases in
the expected value of rmspreferences and the xed cost of disclosure; (ii) increases in the
uncertainty about rms preferences, (iii) is constant in the correlation across cash ows,
and (iv) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal cost of bias.
Corollary 1 suggests that greater disclosure about rmspreferences (e.g., managerial in-
centive plans) that reduces  may, in turn, result in fewer value-relevant reports. While
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providing information about  increases investorsunderstanding of the incentives to bias
makes any published report more value relevant, it causes fewer rms to commit to disclose.
Corollary 5 shows that the second e¤ect dominates such that price e¢ ciency decreases. Two
similar forces are at work when the correlation of cash ows increases. With a given number
of available reports, price e¢ ciency increases with an increase in . With an endogenous
number, both e¤ects o¤set each other such that price e¢ ciency is constant at all points
where condition (15) holds with equality. Between these points, price e¢ ciency increases in
: this is similar to the e¤ect on expected bias.
Furthermore, Corollary 5 provides insights pertaining to the value relevance of rms
disclosures. Settings with an exogenous number of disclosing rms predict that greater
enforcement of disclosure regulations, or sti¤er penalties for violations of those regulations
(as represented by an increase in c), increase the value relevance of rmsdisclosed reports.
Corollary 5 shows that this is not necessarily the case when the number of disclosing rms
is determined endogenously. Specically, the comparative static can be expressed as follows
dV
dc
=
1
22

2K
c (   2)   
s
2K
c (   2)c. (20)
Starting at c = 0, an increase in c increases price e¢ ciency (because 2K
c( 2)  > 0 for small
c). However, as c increases the rate of increase in price e¢ ciency declines and, eventually,
price e¢ ciency decrease in c. That is, when the cost of bias exceeds the threshold cV = 2K 2


,
further increases in c deter a su¢ cient number of rms from disclosing a report such that
prices become less e¢ cient. This analysis suggests that enforcement of disclosure regulations
helps price e¢ ciency only to a certain degree. Once the enforcement becomes too strong,
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further increases in enforcement reduce price e¢ ciency.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discuss bias in rmsdisclosures in a multi-rm setting; this extends the
literature on bias in single-rm settings. We assume that the market cannot observe the
chosen bias and, additionally, is uncertain about a rms preferences as it relates to managing
its stock price. Our main innovation comes from treating the number of rms that disclose as
endogenous. We believe that this assumption is descriptive of many types of disclosure, given
that rms even have (some) inuence on their exposure to mandatory disclosure regimes.
The model allows us to derive novel, and potentially testable, predictions. For example,
we show that when we treat the number of rms that disclose as endogenous, this number
increases in the prior uncertainty about rmscash ows, and decreases in the correlation
across these cash ows. Further, we show that several empirical implications from the
setting with an exogenous number of rms do not continue to hold when the number of
rms is allowed to be endogenous. This highlights that the number of rms that disclose
information is an important variable to control for in empirical studies. In other words, some
of the predictions from a standard model of reporting bias are di¤erent for settings where
rms have to disclose and where they can choose whether to disclose.
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Appendix
Table 1 - Notation
~vi  N (0; 2) nal cash ow of rm i, with variance 2
 correlation among the cash ows of rms i and j, i 6= j
ei = ~vi + ~ni report about rm is cash ow
~ni  N (0; ) measurement noise in report, with variance 
xi  N (; ) rm is interest in its price, with variance 
 expected value of rm is price preferences
K xed cost of disclosing information
Table 1: Notation
Table 2 - Comparative Statics
Number of
rms, M
Response
coe¢ cient,
1
Relative
weight,
2=1
Expected
bias, E [bi]
Price e¢ -
ciency, V
M M M M M M M M
Expected incentive,   0 + 0 + + + 0 
Proprietary cost, K  0 + 0 + 0 + 0 
Incentive uncertainty,  +   +     +
Information quality,  1 + + 0   + 0 + +
Cash ow uncertainty, 2 + + 0   + 0 + +
Correlation,    0 + +  0 + 0
Bias cost, c /+ + +  /+   + /+
Number of rms, M ?  ? + ?  ? + ?
Table 2: Comparative statics with an exogenous number of reports, M , and an endogenous
number of reports, M.
29
Proofs
Corollary 1
 Di¤erentiating eqn. (16) with respect to  yields:
@G (M)
@
=  1
2
p
2K
c
(   2)2
q
K c
 2
 2K
2
c
(2K + (   2) c ( + 2 (1  ) (1 + (M   1) )))2
Q4
 2K
2
c
+c242 (   2)2 (1  ) (M   1) (1  +M)
Q4
, with
Q4 =
 
2K + c
 
 + 2   2     22  2K + c     2   + 2   2+M22 .
As @G(M)
@M
> 0, the above implies that M is increasing in .
 Di¤erentiating eqn. (16) with respect to X yields:
@G (M)
@X
=
c
2
p
Xc
+c2
Mc2 (1  ) (2X + 2c + 2c2 (1  ) + (M   1) c2)
(c2 (1  ) + c +X + c2M)2 (c2 (1  ) + c +X)2
+c2
(X + c + c2 (1  2) (1  ))
(c2 (1  ) + c +X + c2M)2 (c2 (1  ) + c +X) .
Thus, M decreases in K and .
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 Di¤erentiating eqn. (16) with respect to  yields:
@G (M)
@
=
c22H (M)
(X + c + c2   c2)2 (X + c + c2   c2+Mc2)2 , with
H (M) = Mc2 (1  )  X + c + c2 (1  + (M   1) )
+
 
X + c + c2 (1  ) (1  + (M   1) )  X + c + c2 (1  ) .
Thus, M decreases in .
 Di¤erentiating eqn. (16) with respect to 2 yields:
@G (M)
@2
=
 c (X + c)H (M)
(X + c + c   c)2 (X + c + c   c+Mc)2 , with
H (M) = Mc2 (1  )  2X + 2c2 + 2c   3c2+Mc2
+
 
X + c2 + c   3c2+ 2c22  X + c2 + c   c2 .
Thus, M increases in 2.
 Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to  yields:
@G (M)
@
= c24
(M   1) (X + c) (2X + 2c + 2c2   2c2+Mc2)
(X + c + c2   c2)2 (X + c + c2   c2+Mc2)2 .
Thus, M decreases in .
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 Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to c yields:
@G (M)
@c
=
1
2
p
Xp
c
  2X (X + c + c
2 (1  ) (1 + (M   1) ))2
(X + c + c2 (1  ))2 (X + c + c2 (1 + (M   1) ))2
 2X (c
2)
2
(1  ) 2 (M   1) (1 + (M   1) )
(X + c + c2 (1  ))2 (X + c + c2 (1 + (M   1) ))2 .
It can be shown that there exist conditions under which either @F (M)
@c
> 0 or @F (M)
@c
< 0.
Corollaries 2 - 5
Corollaries 2 - 5 are straightforward derivatives of the respective variables.
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